for Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan. 23 Several months later, Pre-Trial Chamber I granted the request. 24 Before doing so, it reviewed the information submitted by the Prosecution in support of the arrest warrant, and concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that President Bashir was criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
III. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Nearly ten years has passed since the Security Council's referral of Darfur to the ICC, yet there has been almost no tangible progress. The violence in Darfur has not stopped and government forces continue to engage in indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians. 28 Rather than improving over time, the situation in Darfur actually worsened in 2014. 29 Moreover, the most recent round of peace talks between the government of Sudan and various rebel groups collapsed in early December. 30 And the UN peacekeeping force in Darfur is set to shrink or even disappear, despite the increasing violence 31 because the peacekeepers have found it virtually impossible to be 26 See Rome Statute, Art. 58(1) (July 1, 2002) (requiring the Pre-Trial Chamber to examine the information submitted by the Prosecutor and determine whether there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" before issuing an arrest warrant). . 28 See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7337th Mtg. at 3, UN Doc. No. S/PV.7337 (Dec. 12, 2014) ("My Office's factual indicators seem to illustrate a similar pattern of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians by the Rapid Support Forces."). 29 See Id . at 2 (noting in her presentation to the Security Council, the Prosecutor noted that "the situation in Darfur continue [s] Sudan that brings to power a government willing to cooperate, or much more muscular action by the Security Council to compel the existing Sudanese regime to cooperate. As things stand, neither seems likely in the short term.
IV. THE ICC HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE VIOLENCE IN DARFUR
The legal issues that arise out of the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council are relatively straightforward: the ICC has the necessary legal authority to succeed. Unfortunately, as the ICC's experience with Darfur shows, legal authority is at best only weakly connected to success. First of all, the Rome Statute gives the Security Council the authority to refer matters to the ICC, and this serves as a proper jurisdictional basis for the court to investigate the situation, 39 although using this authority may not always be a good idea. 40 Next, the Security Council has authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to take measures not including the use of armed force to resolve threats to international peace and security. 41 This includes the authority to subject Sudan to the jurisdiction of the court against its will and to order Sudan to cooperate with the court. 42 Thus, there is little doubt that the referral was lawful, the ICC properly has 39 
V. SO WHY HAS THE ICC MADE SO LITTLE PROGRESS IN DARFUR?
As a matter of law, the ICC has most of what it needs to conduct its investigations and obtain custody of the accused -most notably jurisdiction over the situation and a Security Council
Resolution requiring Sudan to cooperate. In practice, however, the legal issues have proved to be relatively unimportant compared to the political issues. This was recognized early on by a number of commentators. For example, Cherif Bassiouni, writing in 2006, described the Darfur referral as a "near mission impossible" because of the expected lack of political support from the Security 57 Id. at 7. 58 Id. at 7-8. 59 Id. at 9-11. 60 See Record of the 7337 th Mtg., supra note 27, 11-13. 61 Id. at 13. 62 Id. at 13-14. 63 Id. at 14. 64 Id. at 15-16. 65 142 See Rome Statute, Preamble (noting that the ICC was established to ensure that "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole [do] not go unpunished" and to "put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes"). 143 See supra notes 60, 68. 144 See supra note 81. 145 See Kaye, supra note 128, at 10. 146 Id. at 9. 156 Russia is using a strategy of control rather than marginalization.
Of all the permanent members, China appears to be the only one with a principled opposition to the ICC, although power concerns are also present. Historically, China has given great weight to the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. 157 This has carried through to 152 Id. at 19. 153 Id. 154 See, e.g., Id . at 20 (suggesting that the ICC should not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression "in the absence of a definition of aggression by the Security Council" and that "in the absence of a direct instruction, Security Council resolutions do not abrogate the norms of general international law on the immunity of heads of State in office"). 155 See, e.g., Id . at 19 (characterizing the ICC as a "new tool" that the Council can use in maintaining international peace and security). 156 See Kaye, supra note 128, at 13 (noting that Russia is likely to take a "case-by-case approach" to the ICC that will not depend particularly on principles of accountability and justice the present, with the Chinese representative to the Security Council stressing that the Council must be guided in its work by the "fundamental principles of respect for national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of States." 158 Thus, while China views the ICC as an "integral part of the international system," it believes that the ICC must also abide by the principles of nonintervention and sovereignty. 159 This suggests that China will generally be supportive of or at least ambivalent about the ICC's work when a state has consented to the Court's jurisdiction, but will generally oppose the use of the Security Council to subject a state to the court's jurisdiction against its will.
160
On the other hand, Professor Kaye suggests that concerns about non-interference and sovereignty may be less relevant today than they have been in the past for China. 161 Particularly as China becomes more powerful militarily and politically, it may be less committed to a policy of non-interference because of the constraints such a policy imposes on its freedom of action. As with Russia and the U.S., there also appears to be a concern that a strong independent Court could be a potential threat. 162 Like Russia, China thinks the best solution to the potential difficulties created by an independent ICC is to have the ICC defer to the Security Council. 163 This would, of course, give China an effective veto over ICC action. Ultimately, China will be predisposed to oppose Security Council action that subjects a state to ICC jurisdiction against its will, although it 158 See Record of the 6849 th Mtg., supra note 141, at 12. 159 Id. 160 Id. ("States bear the primary responsibility to punish international crimes, eliminate impunity and achieve justice. The ICC can supplement but not replace national jurisdictions"). See also Record of the 7285 th Mtg., supra note 82, at 11 ("The ICC should strictly abide by the principle of complementarity . . . ."). 161 See Kaye, supra note 128, at 11. 162 Id. at 10 ("Officials of both countries are said to harbor concerns about a possible ICC focus on their own domestic conflicts. . . ."). 163 See Record of the 6849 th Mtg., supra note 141, at 12 ("Since the Charter entrusts the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, we hope that the ICC will exercise caution in carrying out its functions and avoid impeding the work of the Security Council . . ."). See also Record of the 7285 th Meeting of the Security Council, supra note 82, at 12 ("The ICC should . . . support the Council's efforts to fulfil its responsibilities under the Charter."). [Vol 26:1 will also factor in pragmatic considerations of how ICC action would affect its interests. 164 Like Russia, China seeks to control the court rather than accept it.
165
The ICC can count on France and Britain to support it. 166 They have both accepted the ICC's goals and methods. The ICC can also probably count on U.S. support on most issues, unless it initiates a prosecution of a U.S. national, at which point the U.S. might shift back to a strategy of active marginalization. 167 By the same token, the ICC can probably count on Russia and China to use their position as permanent members of the Security Council to try to control the court.
168
This will mean that Russia and China will use their vetoes to protect themselves and their allies.
To the extent that the court is willing to defer to Russia and China's interests in its selection of situations to investigate, it could probably neutralize that opposition, but sacrificing its independence would be anathema to the court, which is founded on the ideal of an "independent permanent International Criminal Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole."
169

VII. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR STATES TO SUPPORT THE ICC?
Throughout Luckily, there have been a number of calls for the Security Council to take specific actions.
Looking at these can give us some sense of what states mean when they say they "support" the ICC, as well as an idea of what actions the Council would likely take if the threat of a permanent member veto was removed. The proposal that appears to have the most support is for the Security Council to create a monitoring mechanism, most likely in the form of a permanent subsidiary body, which would review state compliance with the Council's ICC-related resolutions and recommend 170 See Record of the 7337 th Mtg., supra note 28, at 14. 171 Id. 172 See, e.g., Record of the 7337 th Mtg., supra note 28, at 13-14 (Republic of Korea). 173 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 151. 174 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 81 (noting that Russia and China vetoed referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC). [Vol 26:1 action the Council should take to achieve compliance. The creation of a formal monitoring mechanism has been endorsed by a significant number of states. Finally, Hungary has proposed the creation of "clear and public criteria" that the Security Council would agree to follow in deciding both when to refer matters to the ICC and how to ensure accountability for such referrals.
188
The first thing to note is that a significant number of states have said on the record that they would be willing to take concrete action to support the ICC. For most states, support does mean more than just praising the ICC during public debates. Moreover, it is quite likely that some of the states that took no position on particular proposals for action would nonetheless vote in favor of them if given the opportunity. On the other hand, it is also noticeable that the stronger the proposal, 182 It is unlikely that it would be empowered to take action on its own authority. Thus, it would not lead automatically to concrete action. On the other hand, having formal recommendations for action might make it more likely that the Council acted on those recommendations.
There also appears to be broad support for having the United Nations pay the costs of Fifth, it appears that many states would be willing to take concrete action to support the ICC. If the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto was removed, the steps that would be both most likely to occur and most useful would be for the UN to pay for the cost of referrals, for ICC indictees to be put on the UN's targeted sanctions lists, and for the Security Council to formally find that Sudan is in breach of its obligations under Resolution 1593. While none of these would guarantee success, collectively they would support the ICC while pressuring Sudan to cooperate.
A small number of states would favor even bolder action. 204 See supra text accompanying notes 103-104 (noting that Japan and South Korea support the ICC). 205 For example, Thailand's representative never even mentioned the ICC when it spoke to the Security Council. States whose senior officials are under threat by the ICC are likely to be extremely motivated to obstruct the ICC, while those states that support international criminal justice are likely to be relatively diffuse in that support. 208 There will also be spoilers like China and Russia who see political or economic advantage in providing shelter to states like Sudan. 209 Thus, paralysis may well be the norm for the short to medium term. On the other hand, the majority of states do care about international criminal justice and ending impunity. Of course, it will rarely be motivations when deciding how assertive to be in support of the ICC. But the fact that there is broad support for ending impunity among the majority of nations suggests that the trend over time will be towards greater enforcement. Or, to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the evidence suggests that the arc of history will bend towards justice.
210
